The Overlooked Chapter of the Korean War
David Cheng Chang's book on the Korean War fills an important void with fresh insights.
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This June 25th marks the 75th anniversary of the Korean War, a crucial yet often overlooked event in history. While numerous accounts focus on the American experience, few delve into the intriguing story of why many Chinese prisoners of war (POWs) chose not to return to Communist China, opting instead for Taiwan. David Cheng Chang's gripping book, “The Hijacked War: The Story of Chinese POWs in the Korean War,” fills an important void with fresh insights.
Chang, a professor at Hong Kong University, divides the three-year war (June 1950 - May 1953) into two phases in his book: the first, between June 1950 and June 1951, focused on territorial conflict, and the second, between July 1951 and May 1953, centered on the issue of POWs’ repatriation.
The Korean War erupted on June 25, 1950, as North Korea’s leader, Kim Il-sung, backed by the Soviet Union and newly established Communist China, invaded South Korea. , aiming to unify the Korean Peninsula under his Communist regime. Initially, the North achieved significant victories, capturing large portions of the South, including Seoul, the capital of South Korea. Yet, beginning in August, a turning point was reached as U.S.-led United Nations Command (UNC) troops, in coordination with South Korean forces, pushed back against the North.
As the UNC troops advanced toward the Sino-North Korean border, Chairman Mao of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) decided to intervene by sending the Chinese People's Volunteer Army (CPV) into Korea. The term "volunteer," noted by Chang, was a deceptive label meant to obscure China's intentions and lead the Americans to underestimate its resolve. The CPV consisted of some of the most battle-hardened People's Liberation Army (PLA) units. Mao ordered CPV soldiers to strip of their PLA badges for disguise, and their scout units masqueraded as members of the North Korean People's Army (KPA). By hiding during the day and marching at night, Mao successfully moved over 200,000 troops into Korea undetected by U.S. Air Force and intelligence.
Mao's strategic deception was pivotal in the early phases of the Korean War. General McArthur, displaying misplaced confidence, dismissed captured Chinese prisoners of war (POWs) as mere "stragglers" or "volunteers." He assured President Truman in 1950 that "the Chinese would not attack" and proclaimed that "we had won the war." This overconfidence, coupled with ineffective intelligence gathering from his staff (none of them speak or read Chinese), allowed Mao’s ruse to flourish. The CPV exploited the element of surprise during their first three offensives, pushing the UNC troops back
The tide began to change when President Harry Truman replaced McArthur with General Matthew B. Ridgway. Under Ridgway's leadership, the UNC started to secure victories against the CPV and KPA forces, and captured around 20,000 Chinese and 150,000 Korean POWs by June 1951.
As the Korean War progressed, North Korea’s Kim Il-sung recognized that achieving unification through military means was unlikely. In June 1951, China, North Korea, and the United States began truce negotiations. Initially, all sides were able to resolve disputes over territorial and border issues quickly. However, to their surprise, the seemingly straightforward negotiations were complicated by the unexpected issue of POW repatriation.
The initial assumption was to adhere to the Geneva Convention's "all for all" policy, which required any "detaining authority" holding POWs to repatriate all of them to their homelands as soon as the war ended. However, the U.S. government became aware that after World War II, the Soviet Union had treated repatriated POWs very poorly. As a result, President Harry Truman announced a "voluntary repatriation" policy for Chinese and Korean POWs.
Both China and North Korea rejected the idea of voluntary repatriation outright. Nevertheless, the U.S. government insisted on Truman's policy. After more bloodshed on the battlefield and following an overly optimistic estimate from an American negotiator—suggesting that the majority of Chinese and North Korean POWs would choose repatriation—China and North Korea eventually agreed to the terms.
The Americans in charge of POWs conducted a survey of the camp and were taken aback by the findings. While a significant majority of North Korean POWs opted for repatriation, over 75% of Chinese POWs were anti-repatriation and even threatened to use violence if forced to repatriate. When the Americans presented these results to their Chinese and North Korean counterparts, Chinese negotiators accused them of plotting a conspiracy. Chairman Mao took the survey outcome as a personal humiliation. He overruled Kim Il-Sung's plea to cease hostilities and ordered the CPV troops to continue fighting, aiming to exert pressure on the United States to force more Chinese POWs to return to China.
Chang emphasized that the many Chinese prisoners of war (POWs) who refused to return home “extended the Korean War by fifteen months and prolonged their captivity for an additional 180 days following the armistice agreement signed on July 27, 1953.” This led him to title his book “The Hijacked War,” which suggests that the choices of anti-repatriation Chinese POWs and Beijing's abrupt policy changes eclipsed the original purpose of the war, which centered on the territorial disputes of another nation.
Chang’s book provides thorough analysis of why so many Chinese POWs opted not to return to China. He divides them into three factions. One group consisted of seasoned party members, who understood that the CCP always regarded POWs as “traitors,” and had witnessed brutal tactics the CCP deployed against “traitors” in the past. The fear of retribution from the CCP compelled these group of POWs not wanting to return to Communist China.
The second group of prisoners of war (POWs) comprised former Nationalist soldiers who were captured during China’s Civil War (1945-1949) and subsequently forced into the ranks of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA). These soldiers deeply resented the Chinese Communist Party’s (CCP) oppressive control and relentless political indoctrination. Their non-combat hours were dominated by tedious political studies and struggle sessions, wherein self-criticism and mutual criticism were ruthlessly enforced. Such an oppressive atmosphere led to a state of “constant physical and mental exhaustion” among the soldiers. Loyalty to the Nationalist government remained strong, fueling a desire to escape to Taiwan and reunite with Nationalist forces.
Last but not least, both pro-repatriation and anti-repatriation POWs used violence, including beatings and murder, against some of those who most vocally disagreed with them in the camps. This fear caused many POWs to be dishonest in their responses to the American repatriation survey.
Chang notes that Taiwan benefited greatly from the Korean War without sending any troops because ultimately, about two-thirds of the 21,000 Chinese POWs ended up going to Taiwan, while only one-third returned to Communist China. Allen Dulles, the CIA director, called this outcome "one of the greatest psychological victories achieved by the free world against Communism."
The Chinese POWs who returned to Communist China discovered the harsh realities of the CCP’s cruelty. Held in two small towns in Manchuria for nearly a year, they faced a daunting evaluation process. Most of them who were CCP members were expelled from the party, dishonorably discharged from the PLA, and sent home without support.
Unknown to the POWs at the time, the CCP forward dossiers about them to local party branches and governments where they returned to. Chang noted, “each man's dossier contained secret labels like ‘for internal control and monitoring’ and ‘suspected spy.’” These documents effectively sealed the fate of many former POWs, making it nearly impossible for them to find jobs. Countless individuals were later arrested and persecuted during the CCP's relentless political campaigns.
The Chinese POWs who went to Taiwan generally had a more favorable experience. Initially, the Taiwanese government harbored suspicions about their loyalty as well. A few of them were arrested and charged as spies for the CCP. However, as Taiwan gradually moved toward democracy and a market economy, many former POWs were able to retire from military service and pursue new careers and interests.
Chang’s book showcases his thorough research and balanced approach on a complex issue. He presents the stories of both pro-repatriation and anti-repatriation POWs in a fair and objective way, without favoring either ideological side. The individual narratives in the book are not only engaging but also serve as a powerful reminder of the importance of humanity, particularly in the context of war. The book ends on a cautionary note: the CCP's mistreatment of repatriated POWs, despite promising them amnesty, stands as a stark warning to never trust the CCP.
Thank you for this historical context!