It's a Deterrence
Why the Maduro’s Capture Deters, Not Encourages, a Chinese Invasion of Taiwan
Following the U.S. military’s successful capture of Venezuelan leader Nicolás Maduro on January 3, 2026—an operation that also included targeted strikes on Venezuelan infrastructure—some foreign policy commentators/experts hastily predicted that Beijing would view it as a precedent emboldening an invasion of Taiwan. This interpretation fundamentally misunderstands Xi Jinping’s strategic calculus and the Chinese Communist Party’s (CCP) long-standing ambitions.
Let’s be clear: The CCP requires no external “precedent” to justify action against Taiwan. It has consistently claimed the democratically governed island as an inseparable province, framing any move to control it as a domestic affair. Taiwan’s vibrant democracy stands as an existential ideological threat to the CCP’s authoritarian rule, undermining its narrative of superiority. Since 1949, Beijing has never renounced the use of force for “reunification,” and Xi has tied this goal to his personal legacy.
In his New Year’s Eve address for 2026 (delivered December 31, 2025), Xi reiterated: “The reunification of our motherland, a trend of the times, is unstoppable.” This rhetoric aligns with the CCP’s establishment of an annual “Taiwan Recovery Day” in 2025, commemorating the end of Japanese rule over the island.
China possesses both the intent and growing capability to pursue this objective. Under Xi, the People’s Liberation Army Navy has become the world’s largest by hull count, with over 370 vessels, and a projected fleet of 425 ships by 2030. As of early 2026, it operates three aircraft carriers—Liaoning, Shandong, and the newly commissioned Fujian (China’s first with electromagnetic catapults)—and projections indicate plans for up to nine by 2035.
In late December 2025, following the U.S. announcement of an $11.1 billion arms package to Taiwan (the largest ever, including HIMARS rocket systems and drones), the PLA launched “Justice Mission 2025.” This massive exercise—the largest to date—involved live-fire drills, blockade simulations, and over 130 aircraft sorties, prominently featuring the carrier Shandong. It rehearsed choking Taiwan’s supply lines through port blockades and countering external intervention before any amphibious assault.
China possesses the resolve, capability, and a well-defined strategy for an invasion of Taiwan, ready to act at a moment’s notice. The only factor currently restraining China from taking decisive action is its concern over U.S. intervention. President Xi Jinping desires a swift military victory and aims to avoid a drawn-out and bloody conflict with the United States over Taiwan. Consequently, Xi would only proceed with an invasion if he is confident that an isolationist U.S. president is in power or if he perceives the U.S. military to be significantly weakened, posing little threat to the PLA.
President Trump’s second term has decisively shattered any such illusion. From the precision strikes obliterating three key Iranian nuclear facilities (Fordow, Natanz, and Isfahan) in June 2025, to the bold extraction of Maduro in January 2026, Trump has proven himself far from the isolationist his critics portray him to be.
While Trump often adopts a conciliatory stance toward adversaries like Russia’s Vladimir Putin and China’s Xi Jinping in diplomatic settings, Trump has also shown a readiness to deploy U.S. military power in bold ways that effectively safeguard American security and interests, frequently at little risk to the U.S. military. These military actions not only reinforce America’s global standing but also highlight that the U.S. military remains unmatched, boasting unrivaled technological prowess.
The U.S. operation to capture Maduro especially revealed China’s weaknesses. Mere hours before the raid, Maduro was meeting with a senior Chinese delegation at his Miraflores Palace to solidify their strategic partnership. Chinese diplomats and intelligence officials were blindsided by the swift turn of events, revealing a vulnerability in their oversight.
To compound this embarrassment, Chinese-supplied early warning radars reportedly malfunctioned during the U.S. military operation, underscoring the consequences of misplaced trust in China’s defensive capabilities.
China’s Xi must acknowledge by now that Donald Trump does not subscribe to isolationism and that there are still substantial technological and intelligence gaps between the PLA and the U.S. military. Rather than feeling emboldened to invade Taiwan, Xi’s has to focus on protecting China’s economic interests in Venezuela.
China is Venezuela’s largest oil buyer and a major creditor, with historical loans and investments totaling over $100 billion (outstanding debt estimated at $10–20 billion). The Maduro’s capture jeopardizes these economic stakes and Xi’s geopolitical expansion in Latin America, forcing Xi, at least for now, to prioritize damage control over escalation in the Taiwan Strait.
Rather than empowering Beijing, Trump's actions showcase the U.S. military’s dominance. His unpredictable and sometimes “madman” foreign policy approach serves as a formidable deterrent against Chinese aggression toward Taiwan—that’s good news to Taipei and U.S. allies across the Indo-Pacific. The prevailing belief that this is a precedent-setting provocation is fundamentally flawed; it is, in fact, deterrence in action.